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Carbon storage: the economic efficiency of storing CO2 in leaky reservoirs
Minh Ha-Duong, David W. Keith
Abstract Fossil fuels can be used with minimal atmo-
spheric emissions of carbon dioxide by capturing and
storing the CO2 away in geologic structures. However,
stored CO2 can leak back to the atmosphere reducing the
utility of this technology. To explore the trade-offs be-
tween discounting, leakage, the cost of sequestration and
the energy penalty (the energy necessary to capture,
transport and inject carbon underground), we derive
analytic expressions for the value of leaky CO2 storage
compared to perfect storage when storage is a marginal
component of the energy system. If the annual leak rate is
1% and the discount rate is 4%, for example, then CO2
mitigation using leaky storage is worth 80% of mitigation
with perfect storage. Using an integrated assessment
numerical model (DIAM) to explore the role of leakage
when CO2 storage is non-marginal, we find that a leakage
rate of 0.1% is nearly the same as perfect storage while a
leakage rate of 0.5% renders storage unattractive. The
possibility of capturing CO2 from the air, not only from
flue gases, makes storage with higher leakage rates inter-
esting. Finally, we speculate about the role of imperfect
carbon storage in carbon accounting and trading.
Carbon storage
Introduction
Geologic carbon storage is a means of storing carbon
dioxide (CO2) away from the atmosphere by injecting it at
depths greater than about 1 km into porous sedimentary
formations using technologies derived from the oil and gas
industry (Holloway 2001; Herzog 2001; Bachu 2001).
Natural underground reservoirs have held natural CO2 in
place for thousands of years, but leakage does and will occur.
Each year a fraction of the gas stored underground can be
expected to return to the atmosphere. The purpose of this
work is to discuss economic implications of leakage.
Geologic CO2 storage might enable the use of fossil
fuels without contributing to climate change. Doing so
requires a set of technologies for capture, transportation
and injection of CO2. While much is uncertain about fu-
ture technology and its costs, the multiplicity of technical
options and the fact that most if not all of the component
technologies have already been demonstrated at com-
mercial scale strongly suggests that capture and storage is
a viable near-term option for managing CO2 emissions.
The cost of capture generally dominates the cost of
transport and injection. In the electric sector, previous
studies suggest that the cost of avoiding CO2 emissions
using these methods is in order of 50 to 150 U.S.$/tC
(Johnson and Keith 2003; Herzog 1999).
The long-range transportation of CO2 and its injection
into deep underground reservoirs is comparatively well
understood: The upstream oil and gas industry routinely
injects CO2 underground to enhance oil recovery (CO2-
EOR). A bit more than 2,000 km of CO2 pipelines have
been laid in Texas to provide for CO2-EOR. In these
operations the goal is to maximize oil return and minimize
the carbon left underground so that it can be re-used, since
operators must pay for the CO2. Yet at the end of an EOR
operation a major fraction of CO2 purchased remains
underground.
Industrial experience with CO2-EOR and with the dis-
posal of CO2-rich acid gas streams, as well as related
experience with natural gas storage and the underground
disposal of other wastes, suggests that this technology can
be implemented with acceptable local risk and that it could
therefore play a significant role as a response to the
challenge of global warming. This is why geologic carbon
storage has become more and more relevant as a climate
policy option during these last 5 years. The section ‘‘Dis-
cussions about leakage’’ extends this introduction with a
short review of the literature on leakage.
We assess the economic implications of CO2 storage in
leaky reservoirs from two perspectives. First, in the section
‘‘Microeconomics of leakage’’, we take consider the cost
effectiveness of mitigation options while assuming that
storage is a marginal component of the energy system. We
assess the relative value of perfect and imperfect storage,
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or equivalently of imperfect storage and a non-carbon
alternative energy source that is adopted to mitigate CO2
emissions. An efficiency ratio involving the leakage rate,
the discount rate, and the energy intensity of storage is
derived to compare the two technologies.
Second, in the section ‘‘Numerical results in a long run
cost–benefit model’’ we address the economics of leakage
when CO2 storage plays a significant (non-marginal) role
in the energy system so that the flux of leaking CO2 can be
large compared to emissions from other sources. This
analysis adopts the perspective of optimal climate policy in
which trade-offs between costs and benefits play out over
time. The problem of finding the efficient mix of two
abatement technologies (one being carbon capture and
storage) is solved using a numeric optimization model:
DIAM. Simulations of optimal long-term global CO2 tra-
jectories confirm the orders of magnitude previously
found: a leak rate of 0.1%/year is roughly equivalent to
perfect storage. For higher leak rates, the availability of air
capture can make a significant difference.
The last section discusses policy implications for reg-
ulating storage activities.
Discussions about leakage
Natural analogues show that carbon dioxide can remain
trapped underground for very long periods, but they also
show that releases can lead to serious local environmental
consequences. Excess local concentration of CO2, for
example, can lead to acidification of ground-water, and
elevated carbon dioxide concentration in soils can kill
plants. While local environmental issues are certainly
important they will be ignored here, as this paper is con-
cerned about the global implications of leakage.
Current research can be organized into two categories:
descriptive and normative. The descriptive research tries
to predict the magnitude of leakage, studying for example
rock formations, existing wells, or natural and artificial
analogues. The normative approach asks ‘‘how small is
small enough’’, framing the problem as a question of re-
source management over time. Our focus is on the nor-
mative problem, but we first review some of the descriptive
literature.
Describing leakage
Both Jimenez and Chalaturnyk (2002) and Celia and Bachu
(2002) explore the mechanisms of leakage. They stress that
leakage is possible through or along existing wells, stating
for example that in the state of Texas in the United States,
more than 1,500,000 oil and gas wells have been drilled.
Precisely assessing the status of these wells is difficult since
more than one-third have been abandoned, some more
than a century ago. The authors conclude that transport
models for leakage analysis must include proper repre-
sentation of existing wells.
Saripalli et al. (2002) present a risk assessment pointing
out that cap-rock integrity, leading to slow leakage, is a
greater cause of concern than the risk of catastrophic
failure at the well head during the injection process. This
does not contradict the previous point that existing wells
are an important factor that compromise cap-rock integrity.
The comparative study by Benson et al. (2002) con-
firms both these ideas: ‘‘Long industrial experience with
CO2 and gases in general shows that the risks from
industrial sequestration facilities are manageable using
standard engineering controls and procedures. [...] On
the other hand, our understanding of and ability to
predict CO2 releases and their characteristics in any given
geologic and geographic setting is far more challenging’’.
They also state that in natural gas storage projects, ‘‘in
the vast majority of cases, leakage is caused by defective
wells (poorly constructed or improperly plugged aban-
doned wells)’’.
How small is small enough? Geophysical aspects.
On the normative point of view, Hepple and Benson (2002)
and Pacala (2002) assessed the maximum leakage (or
seepage) rates that would be compatible with stabilization
of the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. Both
studies find that residence times greater than 1,000 years
(in other words, seepage rates less than 0.1%/year) allow
for an effective storage policy. But the latter study finds
that mean residence time as low as a 100 years could still
allow one to meet a stringent environmental target,
whereas the former states that with few exceptions, a 1%/
year leakage rate is unacceptably high.
This difference can be traced to different assumptions
on the long-term evolution of the mean leakage rate. Pa-
cala assumes that injection is randomly distributed across
a collection of heterogeneous unlimited reservoirs. Con-
sequently in the long run the fraction of carbon remaining
in the less leaky reservoirs increases, so the average leak
rate decreases. On the contrary, Hepple and Benson as-
sume that reservoirs have limited capacity, so as very large
quantities of CO2 are sequestered underground, the
probability of selecting less favorable sites with higher leak
rates will increase.
How small is small enough? Economic aspects
Herzog et al. (2003) calculate the storage effectiveness for
injecting CO2 at various depths in the ocean. Their analysis
can be transposed directly to geological storage, since
deeper oceanic injection is equivalent to less leaky reser-
voirs. They use a Hotelling model, in which the critical
parameter is the long-term evolution of the marginal
damages from climate change, assumed to be equal to the
carbon price. If this rises at or near the discount rate, then
temporary storage is not interesting. If on the contrary
marginal damages are constant, or there is a backstop
technology that caps abatement cost, then temporary
storage is nearly equivalent to permanent storage.
Hawkins (2002) notes that, considering the world’s
fossil fuel reserves as underground stored carbon, the
present global emissions from energy use represent an
annual leak rate of about 0.1% per year, which is unsus-
tainable. He also points out that the leak rate of the current
carbon storage sites is unknown: we can not be sure it is
less than one per thousandth per year. The conclusion is
that, while carbon storage should not be ignored, it should
not crowd out other mitigation options, and the upper
bound on leak rates should be on below a level of concern
given the amount stored.
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Dooley and Wise (2002) used the MiniCAM 2001 inte-
grated assessment model to examine two leak rates: 1%/
year and 0.1%/year. They conclude that the smaller leak
rate does not lead to a substantial impact on required net
annual emissions reductions, in line with the findings of
Hepple and Benson (2002) and Pacala (2002). They also
find that 1% leakage per year is likely intolerable, as it
represents an unacceptably costly financial burden moved
to future generations. The implication is that monitoring
technology should progress to the point where it can re-
solve the fate of injected CO2 with this level of specificity.
Keller et al. (2002) analyze leakage in an optimal eco-
nomic growth framework using both a simple analytic
model and a numerical integrated assessment model. They
conclude that CO2 storage (at a constant marginal cost of
U.S.$100 per ton of C, with a reservoir half-life of
200 years) could reduce mitigation costs and climate
damages considerably, and that a subsidy for the initial
non-competitive storage is sound economic policy.
They also introduce the notion of an efficiency factor of
storage: for example, 100 tons of sequestered CO2 would
be worth 50 tons of avoided CO2 emissions at an efficiency
factor 50%. This factor decreases when the leakage rate
increases or when the energy needed for storage increases.
On the other hand, increasing the discount rate tend to
increase the storage efficiency.
Microeconomics of leakage
This short review of the literature shows that the leakage
rates over 1%/year tend to be on the high side, while
leakage rates less than 0.1%/year tend to be acceptable.
This section uses a simple microeconomic model to dis-
cuss the relation between leakage, the discount rate and
the relative cost of carbon capture and storage. The
argument is based on the equality of marginal costs across
substitutable technologies, and will also discuss the energy
penalty of capture and storage. This leads to an estimation
of a maximal acceptable leakage rate that depends of a
plausible estimate of the ratio between the cost of perfect
storage—or equivalently non-fossil energy—and that of
leaky storage.
Permanent storage by re-capturing leaks
Consider two technological options to deliver energy
without CO2 emissions:
– The first is to use a non-fossil primary energy source so
that paying some incremental cost a above the con-
ventional energy price results in 1 ton of carbon being
not emitted in the atmosphere.
– The second option achieves the same result by pro-
ducing energy burning 1 ton of carbon from fossil
fuels, and then—instead of exhausting it in the atmo-
sphere—capturing and injecting it underground. For
the sake of simplicity we start by neglecting the energy
needed for capture and storage; we will come back on
this assumption later.
Alternatively, one may view the first option as being
perfect storage where the second is imperfect.
To achieve the same environmental result as the first,
the second option has to offset any carbon that leaks out of
underground storage, for example by capturing and stor-
ing additional CO2. If c is the marginal cost to capture
1 ton of carbon and inject it underground, the net present
cost of this technological option will be c plus the cost of
offsetting future leaks. The standard way to assess net
present value NPV of a flow of costs x(t) occurring over
time in the future is to use a parameter called the discount
rate d (similar to an interest rate) and sum up the dis-
counted costs over time (see Portney and Weyant (1999)
for a recent discussion of this standard methodology’s
limitations in the context of climate change):
NPV ¼
Z 1
t¼0
xðtÞedtdt
Assume that leakage is proportional to the amount of
carbon stored, and denote k the annual leakage rate of the
underground carbon reservoir. The storage option entails
an initial cost of c and a subsequent annual cost of x(t)=kc
forever. The total net present cost of the storage option is
thus NPV ¼ c þ kc=d, where kc=d is the geometric sum of
the cost to keep the same total amount of carbon under-
ground by injecting additional CO2 to make up for leaks.
The question is not to determine which of these two
options is cheaper than the other. Both have cost curves
with increasing marginal costs. Basic economic reasoning
suggests that to minimize the cost of meeting any emission
constraint, it is best to spread the effort across the two
technologies so that their marginal cost is the same. The
economic efficiency condition is thus NPV=a, assuming of
course the absence of other strategic, environmental or
political externalities.
This is why, to compare the two technologies, we
determine the ratio r=c/a that corresponds to the eco-
nomic efficiency condition. This ratio corresponds to the
‘‘efficiency factor’’ recently derived in a similar way by
Keller et al. (2002). Economic efficiency implies:
r ¼ d
kþ d ð1Þ
Intuitively, the ratio is less than unity because leaks
make capture and storage less environmentally efficient
than abatement. This is why it has to be cheaper by a
factor of r in order to be as interesting.
This result shows that, as long as the leak rate k is an
order of magnitude lower than the discount rate, then the
penalty for leakage is very small (r is close to one). A
public discount rate of a few percent per year is usually
recognized as a sensible order of magnitude, in line with
observed population and macro-economic growth rates in
the long term. This implies that storage with leak rates of a
few thousandths per year is economically very close to
perfect avoided emissions.
If the leak rate is a few percent per year, then sensitivity
to the discount rate becomes important. Consider for
example a discount rate of 4%/year and a leakage rate of
1%/year. Then r=0.8. Carbon storage should be pushed to
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the point when its marginal cost is 80% of marginal
abatement cost. Supposing for example that the value of
non-emitted carbon is U.S.$10 per ton, this leads to a value
of temporarily stored carbon of U.S.$8 per ton of carbon1.
The penalty is not overwhelming.
Another assumption in Eq. (1) that needs discussion is
that the leakage rate k is constant. Actually, even assuming
that carbon capture and storage operates at a small scale in
front of the energy system, one can expect the storage
conditions to change in the long run as different geologic
reservoirs and new technologies are used. Supposing for
example that k(t)=ke)st, that is a constant decrease at
exponential rate s, then the leakage efficiency ratio becomes:
r ¼ dþ r
kþ dþ r ð2Þ
Intuitively the faster the sinks improve (larger s), the
closer is r to unity. We ignore whether k can be expected to
increase or decrease in the long run.
The energy penalty
Carbon capture and storage has another disadvantage
compared to abatement: it needs energy. For example, a
coal-fired power plant would take an efficiency penalty
when fitted with a system to capture the carbon dioxide
from flue gases. Herzog’s (1999) studies show an energy
penalty in the 14–20% range using existing technology,
and 7–17% using 2012 assumptions. The numbers depend
largely on the existing energy market conditions, since
the penalty is relative to the reference technology for
electricity production.
Define the energy penalty l as follows. To produce the
same amount of energy services that would have emitted
1 ton of carbon in the air, one has to capture and store
1=ð1  lÞ tons of carbon underground. Another way to see
l is to say that the carbon capture and storage process uses
fossil energy, and thus emits l tons of carbon in the air
per ton of carbon stored underground, so that the net
removal from the atmosphere is therefore 1)l ton per ton
of carbon processed.
The energy penalty makes air capture less interesting
than previously. Offsetting leaks by storing more carbon
underground would result in the underground stock
growing exponentially. But future leaks can also be com-
pensated by abatement instead of storage.
Consider a one-time atmospheric removal of one net
ton of carbon, for a storage of 1=ð1  lÞ ton underground.
The initial cost to do this is c=ð1  lÞ. Assume that this
store of carbon in the ground declines at a rate k without
being replenished. Leaks get smaller and smaller with time,
since the stored carbon depletes at an exponential rate k,
and at date t leakage is
k
1  l e
kt
The cost to compensate for this leakage through abatement
is
xðtÞ ¼ a k
1  l e
kt
Assuming a constant discount rate, leakage rate and en-
ergy penalty, the efficiency condition NPV=a leads to:
r ¼ d
k d l ð3Þ
This formula makes explicit the trade-off between the leak
rate and the energy penalty of carbon capture. This kind of
trade-off is likely to be important when comparing dif-
ferent storage options, which would differ both in energy
requirements and in leak rates. If the energy penalty is too
large, then carbon storage does not make economic sense
unless c<0, that is there is a joint benefit to storage (as in
CO2-EOR).
Application
For a given a and c, the ratio r can be used to determine up
to what leakage rate k the storage option is environmen-
tally as efficient as the abatement option. However, it is
necessary to remember that for each technology there is a
portfolio of actions that can be ordered by increasing
marginal costs along a cost curve.
Freund (2001) published explicit estimates of storage
costs curves. Some storage has been achieved at negative
costs as an ancillary benefit of enhanced oil recovery.
Another way to sequester carbon dioxide, less explored
but maybe also profitable, is injection into deep, unmin-
able coal seams because this allows the recovery of the
natural gas that was adsorbed at the surface of the coal
(Reeves 2002, Wong and Gunter 2000). Injection in de-
pleted gas fields is also possible, with maybe the option of
CO2-enhanced gas recovery. Beyond those, the economics
of injection into saline aquifers or into the sea are pres-
ently even more uncertain. Of course, the curve depends
on how the portfolio of actions is delimited, and for each
specific technology costs vary at each particular potential
underground reservoir with geometry, geology, location
and market forces.
There is also a cost curve for producing CO2 streams, as
discussed for example by Johnson and Keith (2003).
Opportunities at very low cost come as by-products of
hydrogen and natural gas production, but quantities are
limited. Higher up on the curve, the majority of today’s
market production comes from natural resources: CO2 is
mined from underground reservoirs such as the Mac Elmo
Dome in Colorado. Presently the average delivered price is
U.S.$10–20 per ton. Herzog (1999) studied the cost of
existing carbon capture systems from power plant flue gas,
which uses an amine-based absorption technology. He
reports mitigation cost in the range U.S.$20–60 per ton of
CO2 using present-day technologies (the price per ton of
carbon is 44/12=3.7 times higher). Beyond that, Ha-Duong
and Keith (2002) discussed how carbon could be captured
directly from the air at over U.S.$150 per ton of carbon, for
example as a joint product of bio-ethanol energy.
The cost curves show that the acceptability of a leakage
rate depends on values of c that may differ between
1
The net effect of d on the dollar value of storage is ambiguous,
because the carbon value decreases but r increases with the
discount rate.
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specific applications, and that our example with plausible
and significant numbers is just that (an example). For a
discount rate of 4%/year and a leakage rate of 1%/year and
an energy penalty of 20%, then r=0.6. With a 5% discount
rate, a 2% leak rate and a 15% energy penalty, the effi-
ciency ratio is still over 50% (0.56).
Since there is evidence that some carbon capture and
storage options are substantially less expensive than
alternatives, this suggests that 1% leakage may be
acceptable in some cases. In the electric sector, for
example, when large reductions in emissions are requested
(greater than 50%), then mitigation using CO2 capture and
storage may be half the cost of mitigation achieved using
non-fossil alternatives (Biggs et al. 2001; Johnson and
Keith 2003).
Numerical results in a long run cost–benefit model
We now turn to the long-term implications of leakage.
This section explores the consequences for climate policy
of leaks in the artificial carbon store, complementing the
previous section by taking a more macro-economic per-
spective on two key issues: non-marginal storage and cost–
benefit analysis.
Concerns about possibly large amounts of carbon
stored underground in the long run can be quantified
using the following orders of magnitude. At the global
scale, if industrial carbon management plays a big role in
mitigating emissions, then as much as 500 GtC could be
stored by 2100. If the average leak rate is only 0.2%
annually, there would be a 1 GtC per year source under-
mining CO2 stabilization. However, storing that much
carbon underground by the end of the century means
storing 5 GtC per year on average, which is several times
larger than the annual leakage in the end.
In order to keep all these numbers and other long-term
assumptions consistent, we resort to a numerical model.
That model also allows us to explore the implications of a
potentially important technology: capturing CO2 directly
from the air. One air capture technology for example could
be to use biomass as a fuel for a power plant, capturing
and storing the CO2 in this plant’s flue gases.
In this study a simple integrated assessment model,
DIAM (Dynamics of Inertia and Adaptability Model), is
used to compare optimal global CO2 strategy with and
without air capture, and with or without leaks. The model
maximizes the expected discounted inter-temporal sum of
inter-temporal utility. DIAM does not represent explicit
individual technologies or capital turnover, but does in-
clude a representation of the inertia related to induced
technical change. The inertia of the worldwide energy
system induces adjustment costs, related to the rate of
change of abatement.
The DIAM version 2.5 used here2 is derived from the
version described by Ha-Duong and Keith (2002). This
numerical experiment is comparable to the previous sec-
tion’s micro-economic model in that carbon stored
underground leaks at a constant annual rate, and two
reduction technologies are available: a generic abatement
technology; and capture with storage. However, the cost
curve for carbon capture and storage is flat because we are
interested in costs for non-marginal quantities. As Ha-
Duong and Keith (2002) discussed, carbon capture and
storage can be modeled as a backstop technology, that is
available at a constant marginal cost of around U.S.$150
per ton of carbon (about half of this is adjustment costs).
This section briefly describes the model, focusing first
on the damage function, and then on the mitigation cost
functions, before reporting the sensitivity of optimal CO2
trajectories to variations in the leakage rate and to the
possibility of capturing carbon directly from the air.
The model
The benefits of avoiding climate change, or alternatively
the cost of climate impact, is represented using a non-
linear damage function (Fig. 1). This frames optimal cli-
mate policy as a problem of action facing a known
threshold of abrupt climate change. While other versions
of DIAM represent uncertainty regarding climate and
ecosystems sensitivity, DIAM 2.5 was run here in deter-
ministic mode to better focus on the role of leakage.
The impact is a function of atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentration lagged 20 years. While it is measured in
monetary units, it represents a global willingness to pay to
avoid the given level of climate change, including non-
market values. The impact at any date is defined as a
fraction of wealth at this date. Therefore it scales over time
with the size of the economy. The assumption is that, even
though a richer economy is structurally better insulated
against climate variations than an poorer economy, the
overall desire to limit interference with the biosphere in-
creases linearly with wealth.
The model represents emissions abatement occurring
by two activities X and Z, each with its own cost function.
Activity X represents emissions abatement through con-
ventional existing energy technologies, its marginal cost
increases with mitigation, and X is constrained below 1.
Fig. 1. The impact of climate change. Fraction of global wealth
lost each year as a function of carbon dioxide concentration, as
used in the cost-benefit model DIAM version 2.5. Damage
depends on concentration 20 years before and is assumed to be
zero in 2000
2 The GAMS source code is available at http://www.andrew.cmu.
edu/user/mduong
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Activity Z represents carbon capture and storage at con-
stant marginal cost. The unavailability of air capture is
represented as the constraint X+Z<1, stating that the total
abatement cannot exceed the overall demand for energy in
the baseline. This constraint can be relaxed to represent
the possibility that Z captures the CO2 directly from the
air, as discussed by Ha-Duong and Keith (2002).
Before leaks, anthropogenic carbon emissions at any
given time are Elanduse+(1)X)Z)Eref. Land use emissions
are exogenous and considered irreducible. In addition, the
underground reservoir S leaks at annual rate k into the
atmosphere. The energy penalty on carbon capture and
storage is l=15%, so an activity level Z corresponds to an
increase of the underground stock by ½Z=ð1  lÞEref .
Table 1 displays the cost of achieving mitigation
activities X and Z. The cost of each activity depends both
on its scale X or Z, and on the rate at which it is being
increased.
Calibration of cost functions were unchanged from the
previous version, and are comparable to the DICE-98
model by Nordhaus and Boyer (2002). Ignoring adjust-
ment costs, activity X incurs quadratic abatement costs up
to full abatement. This leads to a marginal carbon price
increasing linearly. In marginal terms, the order of mag-
nitude is a U.S.$100 carbon tax for a 20% abatement of
world emissions, a common ballpark number.
Results
Results are displayed numerically in Table 2 and graphi-
cally in Fig. 2. Figure 2 shows two variables: global
anthropogenic carbon emissions (excluding leakage) on
the top panel, and carbon dioxide atmospheric concen-
tration on the bottom panel. The top dashed curve cor-
responds to a business as usual reference scenario. The
continuous line corresponds to Table 2’s first row (no
leak, no air capture) while the dashed line next to it cor-
responds to Table 2’s next to the last row (leak rate 0.5%/
year, air capture available).
The results displayed in Fig. 2 illustrate the model
calibration. The overall shape of the optimal trajectories
tells the following plausible story. During the next few
decades, there will be a slow departure from current
trends, because of the considerable inertia in the world’s
energy system. Late in this century, the atmospheric car-
bon dioxide concentration stabilizes below what consti-
tutes in this model a soft ceiling at around 550 parts per
million. In the next century, the atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration will decline.
Our point is not to discuss the desirability of this sto-
ryline in itself. Rather, the model is used to study the
sensitivity of optimal trajectories to two parameters: the
leak rate and whether the backstop technology can capture
carbon from the atmosphere. Results, presented in
Table 2, were remarkably insensitive to the value of the
energy penalty parameter l so this parameter is kept
constant in the simulations.
The table’s rows correspond to various leak rates with
and without the availability of air capture. The columns
show (in 2050 and 2150) three variables: the percentage of
abatement using conventional technologies X; the per-
centage of abatement using the backstop Z and the
atmospheric CO2 concentration M.
First consider the effect of leakage in the absence of
air capture. This corresponds to the top half of Table 2,
or technically the constraint that X+Z cannot go over
100% of reference emissions. We explored leakage rates
ranging from zero to 1%/year. In 2050 the backstop
technology Z is not used in any scenario. It is because at
this date, the marginal cost of X has not risen to the
backstop’s cost. The fact that X differs across rows for
this date reminds us that the model is finding a global
Table 2. Results and sensitivity analysis. Optimal levels of
emissions abatement X are given as a percentage of baseline
emissions. The atmospheric CO2concentration M is in parts per
million. The annual amount of carbon capture and storage Z is
given as a percentage of baseline emissions, and is zero in 2050
for all scenarios. The possibility of capturing carbon directly from
the air (lower part of the table) is represented by relaxing the
constraint X+Z<100% in the optimization program
Air capture? Leak rate Optimum in 2050 Optimum in 2150
Abatement [CO2] Abatement Storage [CO2]
k (%/year) X (%) M (ppmv) X (%) Z (%) M (ppmv)
No 0 17 496 52 47 512
No 0.1 18 494 61 38 525
No 0.5 23 491 93 6 533
No 1 23 490 100 0 529
Yes 0 17 496 58 57 494
Yes 0.1 17 495 61 54 507
Yes 0.5 20 492 86 57 521
Yes 1 23 490 100 0 529
Table 1. The cost of reducing carbon emissions in DIAM 2.5 for
each activity. Gross World Production (GWP) was about
U.S.$18·1012 for the base year. All base costs decline at an
autonomous technical progress rate of 1% per year. The r=30-
year inertia parameter in adjustment costs is the characteristic
time of the world’s energy system
Activity
(Unit)
Total
cost=
Base
cost
· Scale
tC
· Multiplier
(dimensionless)
U.S.$ U.S.$/tC
Conventional
abatement
CX= 2.45%
GWP (t0)
Eref
Eref ðt0Þ
_X2 þ r _X 2
Backstop
Carbon
capture
+storage
CZ= 75 U.S.$/tC _ZE
ref 1+(r _Z)2
Clean Techn Environ Policy 5 (2003)
186
optimum and is thus forward looking. Since it optimizes
intertemporally, Z=0 does not imply that X should be
the same across all four rows.
The model sensibly finds that the larger the leakage
rate, the smaller the carbon capture Z, and the larger the
abatement X should be. This applies at all periods. We
find that with perfect storage, the amount of carbon
capture is lower than, but comparable to, the amount of
abatement. This remains true with a 0.1% leakage rate.
Carbon capture plays a marginal role at 0.5% leak rate,
and does not enter the optimal technology mix at all at
any date with a 1%/year leak.
Consider now the atmospheric concentration M.
Table 2 suggests that optimal M in 2050 and in 2150 varies
in opposite directions when increasing the leak rate. The
intuitions behind this result is that a zero leak rate implies
the availability of a perfect long term pollution sink. This
in turn makes it cheaper to control CO2 emissions. That
has two effects on the optimal trajectories. In the long run
the optimal balance of costs and benefits is tilted toward a
cleaner environment. At the same time, the optimal bur-
den sharing is also tilted toward future generations:
abatement effort in the first periods is comparatively
lower.
How does this change when allowing for air capture?
The lower half of Table 2 presents results where the con-
straint X+Z<100% is relaxed. As the top panel in Figure 2
shows, net emissions indeed become negative around 2110
on the optimal path. As the table shows, in 2150 this (X+Z
greater than 100%) remains true for the lower three
leakage rates. Overall, the qualitative results presented
above remain the same: more leakage implies less reliance
on carbon capture and storage.
Compared to the no-air capture scenarios, there is
more carbon storage everywhere along the way, and
ultimately in 2150 the atmospheric concentration is
lower. Air capture also pushes up the acceptable leak
rate to 0.5%/year. This next-to-the-last row illustrates a
scenario where CO2 stored underground contributes
significantly to the emissions, about 10 GtC/year, but
Fig. 2. Optimal CO2 trajectories. Upper panel,
global carbon emissions, not including emis-
sions from leaks due to underground storage.
Lower panel, atmospheric CO2 concentration
in parts per million
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that source is actively offset by capturing carbon from
the air even through most (86%) of the energy system is
carbon free.
Concluding remarks
Policy implications for the value of carbon
Assuming that market-based instruments will be used
implementing a carbon emissions reduction policy, how
would carbon storage fit within the environmental regu-
latory framework?
The IPCC defined emission trading as ‘‘a market-based
approach to achieving environmental objectives that allows
those reducing greenhouse gas emissions below what is
required to use or trade the excess reductions to offset
emissions at another source inside or outside the country’’.
Imagine for example an operator owning two power plants.
In the first plant A the operator can reduce emissions
easily, but the other plant B uses a different technology and
it is more expensive to reduce emissions there. Under a
flexible regulation regime, if the operator was ordered to
reduce its plants’ overall emissions by 10%, then he would
be allowed to concentrate his efforts on A, go way above
10%, and assign the excess reduction to the plant B.
Emission trading extends this flexibility to situations where
plants A and B are not owned by the same firm.
Firms engaged in carbon capture and storage clearly
have a role to play in this market for certificates of emis-
sions reduction or, in less diplomatic language, pollution
permits. We assert that because of leakage and the energy
penalty, 1 ton stored underground should correspond to
less than 1 ton of carbon permanently removed from the
atmosphere. With the usual caveats about the efficient
markets assumption, about the absence of externalities
and about discounting, the ratio r derived in this paper can
be interpreted as the socially desirable ratio for dis-
counting carbon storage.
The energy penalty should not be left out of the
picture, or one risks creating the opportunity to make
money by simply moving carbon up and down. In an
economy where carbon already has a price reflecting the
climate externality, then storage projects already inter-
nalize the energy penalty. In this situation they should
be regulated using Eq. (1). It is conceivable, however,
that a firm involved in carbon storage faces a carbon
price not reflecting the climate change externality. For
example, energy intensive industries have obtained a
differential treatment in some countries. In this situation
or for a carbon storage project that occurs in a country
not controlling emissions at all, for example as a Clean
Development Mechanism/Joint Implementation project,
Eq. (3) should be used instead.
Conclusion
This paper examined leakage of artificially stored CO2
from an economic perspective, using first a cost–efficiency
microeconomic model, and then a global cost–benefit
integrated assessment model.
Leakage of stored carbon is at heart a problem of inter-
temporal distribution of abatement costs and benefits.
Having decided to mitigate global warming for the benefit
of future generations, the present generation should allo-
cate its efforts as efficiently as possible across the various
technological options. This is why in a normative eco-
nomics analysis the discount rate plays the central role,
and gives the numeric anchor needed to assess what is an
acceptable leakage rate.
The simplest interpretation of our results is that leakage
rates one order of magnitude below the discount rate are
negligible. In line with previous findings from the litera-
ture reviewed, the numerical simulations presented in this
paper found that longer than 1,000 years is practically as
good as infinity. Storage with residence time as short as a
few hundred years may still be valuable.
The microeconomic analysis provides a more detailed
answer for higher leakage rates in term of storage effi-
ciency ratio r. We use this ratio for projects that remove
carbon only temporarily from the atmosphere, to adjust
the credit they can claim and be free from further liabilities
from leakage. Assuming a public discount rate d, a leakage
rate k then a project should be credited only the fraction
d=ðdþ kÞ of the carbon value initially injected. If the
project does not internalize the climate externality in its
energy prices, then the energy penalty term l should be
subtracted from this ratio.
These results hold even for one-time storage opportu-
nities, such as enhanced oil recovery. With a 1% annual
leak rate and a 1–4% discount rate, the economic efficiency
ratio is between 50% and 80%. This is not overwhelming.
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